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The need for a national deradicalisation program in Afghanistan 
 
By:  Johnnie Auld1  
 
 
Introduction 
The lack of deradicalisation programs in Afghanistan has potential to prolong the violence 
and turmoil in the country for decades. With years of conflict, multiple forms of 
government, high unemployment, high levels of poverty, and a constant influx of Western 
cultural norms and media fighting against the traditionalist Afghan culture strongly 
embedded in a conservative reading of Islam, Afghanistan is a breeding ground for 
radicalism. Youth are susceptible to an environment that causes radicalism and nurtures it, 
and with the ever-present national conflict, this radicalisation has an outlet in the form of 
insurgency and terrorism. Groups like the Taliban have easily recruited and radicalised 
individuals using religion as a justification for their violence. Deradicalisation in 
Afghanistan is an under researched topic and an underfunded pursuit. With no national 
deradicalisation strategy it is left to international actors and local organisations to engage in 
these programs. More must be done to engage with those who have become radicalised and 
those in high-risk zones in order to help secure the long-term future of Afghanistan.  
 
I will discuss how Afghanistan is a breeding ground for radicalisation of individuals due to 
Afghanistan’s violent, hostile environment with high rates of poverty, high unemployment 
and distrust toward the authorities. I will then discuss how religion is used a justification by 
extremist groups for individuals to commit violent acts and how the increasingly precarious 
security situation in the country means a sound national deradicalisation program is 
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essential. I conclude that any deradicalisation efforts undertaken by the Afghan government 
so far are piecemeal and inadequate to deal with the on-going problems present in the 
country and that lessons must be learnt from programs in other Islamic countries that have 
successfully deradicalised violent extremist groups.   
 
Regional insecurity 
The security situation, since the NATO drawdown at the end of 2014, has become 
considerably worse throughout Afghanistan. There is a genuine concern amongst Afghans 
now that the situation will only decrease further over time. Large segments of Afghan 
society remain frustrated by physical insecurity, government corruption, poverty and 
growing social inequality. These frustrations are easily manipulated by radical groups and 
make many Afghans susceptible to recruitment and radicalisation, particularly when their 
discontent is aggravated by mistrust of the government or the international community 
(Ruttig, 2015). However, empirical evidence indicates that individuals will not necessarily 
choose one side over another, someone may hold grievances against the government for its 
failings, this does not mean that they will support or join the Taliban, though grievances 
against the government does remain a contributing factor in recruitment to the Taliban. A 
2014 perception survey carried out by ATR Consulting in Afghanistan recorded that only 
12.8% of Afghan men and 1.6% of Afghan women want the Taliban to govern the country. 
Overall, only 7.2% of the Afghan population would like to see the Taliban assume control 
completely, returning to the pre-2001 scenario (ATR, 2014). Military raids, especially at 
night, are often flagged as a major grievance from the people toward the security apparatus 
and are believed to add to the Taliban’s recruitment pool. Therefore, a desire to return of 
Taliban role may be low, but if the contributing factors toward radicalisation are 
insurmountable for an individual, then membership of an extremist group is their channel 
whereby they can relieve their frustrations.  This is discussed in detail below.  
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Enabling environment  
The potential for the radicalisation of youth in Afghanistan is very high compared to many 
other countries. 68% of the population of Afghanistan are under the age of 25. With a high 
birth rate and the absence of a strong state, young Afghans’ prospects and quality of life are 
blighted by lack of security, poverty, drug dependency, lack of educational opportunities, 
and unemployment. This has created fertile ground for radicalisation to occur in 
Afghanistan (Akbar, 2015). Radicalisation also happens at an extremely young age, with 
children coerced into joining fighting groups, it is not just adults who become radicalised 
(Horgan, 2015). The process of modern day radicalisation in Afghanistan did not suddenly 
appear post 2001 as an anti-Western sentiment. Various decades of outside influence has 
shaped the psyche of a population caught between Western modernity, traditional Islamic 
beliefs and culturally inherent Afghan customs. “Unfortunately, life has lost its meaning for 
many Afghans. They have been taught to believe that this life is temporary and one must 
invest in life after death and jihad is the fastest way to lead one to eternal life in paradise” 
(Ahmadi, 2015). 
 
Afghanistan is an unstable breeding ground for the radicalisation of huge numbers of 
people. The central government in Kabul is unable to control large swathes of land, making 
the residents susceptible to influence from external forces and coercive elements (Taspinar, 
2009). In the vacuum left by the lack of a strong government, people rely increasingly on 
support of grass roots groups, they tend to be Islamic and opposed to the democratic system. 
The most obvious direct influence from groups would come in terms of land controlled by 
the Taliban; the northern province of Kunduz for example is all but controlled by the 
Taliban. In Kunduz the Taliban have free reign to deal out their own style of justice, with 
roaming courts and have developed a large network of informants, suppliers and 
sympathisers willing to shelter and support them. This means that individuals and families 
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view them as the ultimate arbiter for major communal and familial decisions, they are often 
more just and fair than the government institutions as they tend to not ask for bribes and 
decisions are made in a short time, unlike the official system (Ali, 2015). This means that 
they have direct access to large groups of young susceptible minds that can easily be 
influenced by extremist rhetoric, or indeed be directly recruited into the Taliban ranks. 
Therefore, with the persistent state of violence in so many provinces in Afghanistan there is 
a constant recruitment pool for extremist groups to choose from. The environment that 
currently exists enables radicalisation and provides them with a violent outlet for their 
perceived injustices. Individuals have many more options than just joining the Taliban; 
namely the more extreme Daesh pose another potentially long-term threat to the country, 
especially if they and others are not part of any negotiations with the Afghan government 
(Osman, 2015).  
 
Diversification of radicalising factors 
Despite the enabling environment created through socioeconomic conditions, violence 
within a community is not in and of itself enough to radicalise an individual. The problem 
of radicalisation is attributed to many complex causal factors, one factor alone does not 
radicalise an individual (Khan et al, 2012). Poverty and unemployment are often held as the 
key contributing factors of a radicalised youth; joining a violent radical group just to escape 
social deprivation due receiving a salary and support for their family. However, a variety of 
factors play a role in what is a phased process to radicalisation. The low levels of education 
in Afghanistan make youth more susceptible to radical views, especially due to the high 
influence of Mullahs. However, it should not be presumed that those with a higher level of 
education are pro-democracy and support the Afghan state. As in the West, those 
influenced to undertake Jihad are often from sound socioeconomic backgrounds. Not all 
those who are well educated and have access to Western media content are pro-democracy, 
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as the Western governments who have spent billions of dollars to help develop the state 
would hope (Osman, 2014). Scepticism towards the democratic system is largely born out of 
experiences in the post 2001 era, though the multiple forms of government Afghanistan has 
experienced in its recent history: monarchy (overthrown in 1973), a Taliban run 
government (overthrown in 2001), and now democracy, have culminated in distrust toward 
any form of central government for many Afghans. Afghanistan remains a largely rural 
country with a harsh environment, difficult to govern with people highly reliant on the 
family and clan unit. Areas not controlled by the government or Taliban are controlled by 
warlords who are currently aligned with the Kabul based government, however, allegiances 
could change if they saw better options elsewhere. Indeed the actions of the post 2001 
democratic government have led many to be untrustworthy towards it; corruption, nepotism 
and political manipulation led to dissatisfaction with what is seen as a Western form of 
governance. This helps create an enabling environment for radicalisation. It enhances the 
opportunities to advance an Islamic identity based on social movement and effectively 
creates a radicalised youth for potentially militant causes (Haque, 2014). 
 
In traditional radicalisation literature there has been the basic belief that poverty and 
unemployment are the drivers to violent extremism, that memberships of an extremist group 
are basically jobs to end poverty for oneself and their family. However, this reasoning has 
been questioned by various studies that claim that injustice is the main reason behind 
radicalisation. A Mercy Corps study on youth carried out in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
stated that assumptions that more jobs make youth less likely to become radicalised is too a 
large extent not true, it is merely a contributing factor. “Principal drivers of political 
violence are rooted not in poverty, but in experiences of injustice: discrimination, corruption 
and abuse by security forces” (Mercy Corps, 2015). Empirical evidence would indicate that 
it is the sense of injustice dealt out toward individuals and groups results in their 
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radicalisation, anger over poverty. “The fact is that empirical research has not been able to 
establish a direct link between collective or individual poverty and terrorism.  In other 
words, this is a myth or at best a half-truth” (Schmid, 2013).  
 
Local traditions 
Many of the radicalised groups in Afghanistan are from a Pashtu background, most notably 
the Taliban. In Afghanistan the Pashtu culture places high societal expectations on young 
men who are expected to provide for their immediate and extended families and abide by 
strict social norms. In rural areas, young men must abide by their community’s code of 
conduct, which often varies depending on family status, tribal standing, and geographic 
background. One of the principles of the code is to protect one’s land and family honour 
with all means and at any cost. Frustration over real and perceived injustice, impunity and 
corruption (which is identified as a huge recruitment tool for the Taliban, see Karimi and 
Ebrahimi, 2015), and a lack of basic infrastructure and community support facilities is 
widespread, especially among young men. These factors make it impossible for them to 
uphold their responsibilities, yet they are still blamed for undermining the family status. 
This results in an almost obvious choice for so many individuals, to take up arms to fight 
against these frustrations to regain honour for themselves, their family, and their culture. 
 
Education 
It is estimated that 90% of madrasas in Afghanistan are unregistered, which is of great 
concern to the government (Khetab, 2015) with research estimating that the number of 
unregistered madrasas is set to rise dramatically (Arian, 2015). Mullahs and Imams are 
central players in the daily lives and beliefs of their congregation, representing not just 
religious but also moral and social guidance. There have been various attempts by the 
Afghan government to bring madrasas in the country under a unified system, as the Saudi 
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government has successfully done, though it has largely failed. Indeed, the Afghan 
government is restricted in its ability to counter the role played by Pakistani madrasas given 
Afghanistan’s weak government run religious education system and the well-developed and 
locally respected madrasa system in neighbouring Pakistan, where large segments of 
Afghans attend school. Here many students become radicalised with teachings of 
conservative Deobandi Islam, they then return to their home communities with often 
conservative and a times extremist views (Roy, 2002). A massive contributing factor to 
students being sent there is due to the current Afghan school system. The public school 
system in Afghanistan is grossly overcrowded; those who do attend class are often neglected 
due to lack of capacity of teachers to accommodate such high numbers of students. Classes 
are large and the school day is short meaning that children have a great deal of unsupervised 
time. Madrasas are often considered to be the centre of radicalising youth in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. However, there has been a lack of focus into the public schooling system and 
how it may be a radicaliser of youth. As in madrasas, most public school teachers have full 
autonomy on what and how they teach. In most cases, school and madrasa teachers rely on 
the most conservative interpretation of religious books that are easily accessible and 
available in markets, most are inaccurate and poorly formatted despite the millions of dollars 
spent on book printing. Therefore, a person does not need to be a student of a madrasa run 
by extremists or member of a radical group to be exposed to radical and violent ideologies. 
Not all those who have grievances or are curious about such ideologies become violent 
extremists, but those who are unable to find nonviolent ways to express their frustrations are 
most likely to take up violent extremism (Ahmadi, 2015). Again, radicalisation is a phased 
process that occurs over time.  
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Religion as a tool 
The culmination of these frustrations has in turn created an opportunity for religious 
extremist movements to exploit, mobilise and radicalise Afghan youth. Along with 
ethnicity, religion has long been a key instrument for violent and non-violent political 
mobilisation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, decades of conflict and divisive domestic politics 
have left Afghan society polarised and ethnically fractured. Aforementioned grievances 
exacerbate these problems of factionalised politics and provide the basis for further 
entrenchment of ethnic and political divisions within Afghan civil society (Porges, 2012). 
Political groups with overt religious agendas are hard at work influencing and mobilising 
young educated women and men. Besides the Taliban there are various groups fighting to 
win over youth to their way of thinking. Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hezb-e Islami, Jamiat- Eslah, and 
the Salafist movement are some of the more prominent groups vying for support from youth. 
They differ in beliefs, strategy and ultimate goal, indeed some adhere to non-violence, but 
they all maintain an anti-democratic sentiment and are therefore opposed to the current 
Afghan state and have often offered an Islamic state based on sharia law as the alternative 
(Osman, 2015). They have been gaining a great deal of success in recruitment at schools and 
universities throughout Afghanistan. They are growing within the educational and 
governmental systems. The one thing all these groups have in common is their traditional 
conservative interpretation of the Quran and a desire for rule by Sharia law (ibid).  
 
Despite there being a wide array of reasons given for someone to commit violent extremist 
acts, religion is the narrative that gives it all meaning, it is the justification that frames the 
struggle. “As a result, religious rhetoric is critically important to the radicalisation process” 
(Porges, 2012). It is central to the Taliban’s recruitment messages; they utilise religion as a 
tool by which individuals can focus their anger at the infidel invaders and their puppet 
government in Kabul. It justifies killing and allows recruits to channel their aforementioned 
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frustrations at a target, while at the same time providing for their family and regaining their 
honour. As mentioned above, religion is not seen as the main cause of radicalisation, 
however it must be viewed as a defining and activating feature of radicalised individuals in 
Afghanistan (Aggarwal, 2015). Regardless of whether religion is a facilitator or merely 
another contributing factor, religious leaders and religious institutions remain essential 
elements of the radicalisation process in Afghanistan. Radicalisation of an individual often 
takes place at a young age with many Afghan youth having attended madrasas in the 
conservative heartland of Pakistan, Peshawar and Swat Valley. Despite that these madrasas 
are seen as recruitment centres for the Taliban, it does not mean all attendees will join 
violent extremist groups. However, when an individual returns to Afghanistan suffers the 
fate of many: unemployment, unable to support himself or his family, being harassed by 
Afghan and foreign security forces, and witnessing violence on a regular basis, then they can 
become radicalised and take the path of violent extremism. What is taught to them in the 
most extreme of madrasas can then be viewed as a parasite that can manifest when a phased 
process occurs (i.e. a combination of factors that cause grievances) resulting in them 
committing violent extremist acts.  
 
Deradicalisation in Afghanistan 
To date the only program launched by the Afghan government has been the UNDP backed 
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) that has sought to reintegrate 
combatants back into society by “combining political, security and development dimensions 
of peace building” (UNDP, 2013). This project has ultimately sought to reintegrate 
individuals by providing jobs and money. It is a water-downed version of others countries 
deradicalisation programs as it does not seek to deprogram individuals who have become 
radicalised and is based on the premise that poverty is the main driver to radicalisation. It 
has failed to address the main drivers of conflict: it ignores the problem of frustration and 
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grievances caused by an untrusted central government and security forces that commit 
widespread abuses. It also ignores the facilitation religion has in allowing a justification for 
violence (Derksen, 2011).  
 
Additionally, deradicalisation efforts could become increasingly important with the spread 
of Daesh within the country. Although it is highly unlikely the group will unseat the 
Taliban as the major insurgency force or overthrow the government due to their 
geographical distance from the main Daesh force in Iraq and Syria, they are a concern due 
to their highly coercive tendencies and ability to recruit extremists en mass (Sainsbury et al 
2015). There are been various cited instances of fighting between Daesh and the Taliban, 
and of cases of Taliban defecting to join Daesh due to the longevity of their cause with as 
yet an unsuitable outcome for them (Iqbal, 2015). Many combatants view Daesh as a better 
option than the Taliban due to frustration of years of fighting with no real gains and since 
they are against any agreement with the Kabul government; Taliban hardliners view any 
agreement as selling out their cause. However, despite Daesh not being able to gain an 
immediate foothold in Afghanistan as they did elsewhere, it is evident of the importance in 
an increase in deradicalisation programs to stop individuals just moving between combatant 
groups. Additionally, the death of Taliban leader, the main uniting presence of the group, 
Mullah Omar, splintered the Taliban into several groups, of which some joined Daesh. 
More pressing though is the current increase in violence by the rivalling Taliban factions 
and the potential knock on effect this has in further creating a radicalised environment 
nationwide. The peace process initiated by the National Unity Government is slow and no 
one can predict when a cease-fire will be agreed to (Ahmad, 2015). With the NATO 
drawdown, the economic opportunities that existed and now largely dissolved and 
unemployment is at an all-time high, a driver of radicalisation to violent extremism. With 
the convergence of the above-mentioned factors it is vital that the government, international 
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actors and local organisations work together to tackle the inevitable fallout and continued 
issues of radicalisation and the process toward radicalisation. Priority should be placed on 
stemming these drivers of radicalisation; countering the influence they have on the Afghan 
people. 
 
Current and past efforts in other countries seeking to deradicalise individuals also focus on 
incentives such as vocational training, small interest free business loans and some sort of job 
development training. However, their scope is much greater than only focusing on 
economic initiatives, with emphasis on rehabilitation, physiological support, and 
deprogramming of extremist beliefs. In Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, which includes many 
fighters returning from Afghanistan, the deradicalisation programs employ a process of 
neutralising the ideological aspects of conditioning that the individual underwent (Porges & 
Stern 2010). This is achieved in combination with financial support, with the hope that 
through this soft power approach, radicals will then view the authorities as more 
trustworthy and willing to help. This is followed by aftercare programs that seek to ensure 
there is no recidivism (Schuzle, 2008 and Porges, 2010). Though modelling itself on the 
Saudi model, Yemen’s attempt at deradicalisation however was seen as a failure with high 
rates of recidivism (detailed analysis: Rabasa et al, 2010). There are various other examples 
of deradicalisation programs worldwide, all of which have had varying degrees of success 
and some claims made by certain governments would require further independent analysis 
to be sure of the numbers, especially Saudi Arabia who claim to have a 100% success rate 
with no recidivism whatsoever (Porges, 2010). Learning best practices and failures from 
these examples and working to develop and tailor them to the Afghan context could provide 
positive outcomes. “The best-designed plans leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their 
objectives. One implication of this observation is that deradicalisation programs cannot 
simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They have 
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to develop organically in a specific country and culture” (Rabasa et al, 2010). Therefore any 
programs must adhere to the unique Afghan situation, not just follow a piecemeal approach 
that has reportedly worked elsewhere. 
 
The lack of normal state functions culminating in poverty, unemployment, and low 
education combined with injustice through military attacks and foreign influence has 
resulted in violence that the state has countered with hard security measures. There is no 
national deradicalisation strategy in place; it has been co-opted by different international 
actors who believe it is a vital strategy to the long-term security of Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. Yet even so it remains under researched, underfunded and lacking in significant 
clarity as to its future. Understanding of the pressing issues has become more apparent with 
the NATO military drawdown. The security vacuum which was created has allowed for 
violent extremist expansion throughout the country, previously secure provinces have 
become overrun with violent groups who have a freehand to administer their own form of 
justice, education, and provide amenities. They are able to convince the people, not 
necessarily through coercion or propaganda, but through service provision, that they can 
support the populace more so than the corrupt government in Kabul.  
 
In such a hostile environment where youth are susceptible to so many different radicalising 
factors why are there so few programs? In 14 years after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan 
why have the international community not invested more time into deradicalisation 
programs to tackle these problems? Why does the government not do more to counter the 
root causes of these problems to develop an enabling environment that includes higher 
levels of education, social and economic equality, and a peaceful society? They have spent 
most of their resources on hard security measures and are now invested more in attempts to 
reproach with the Taliban than tackling root causes of problems. Indeed many Taliban 
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fighters and those from other groups are not Afghan, they will most likely become more 
radicalised and trained to kill when they reach Afghanistan. Knowing nothing but violence 
they may try to return home, therefore any deradicalisation program that can catch and 
assist these individuals before they leave should be promoted. Moreover, it would benefit 
the international community anti-terrorism strategy if there were a more targeted 
engagement of potential recruits to dissuade them from this path. Indeed, deradicalisation 
programs take time to work, there is no quick fix, so the fact that programs are either non-
existent or in their infancy is problematic (Horgan, 2015). Neighbour Pakistan has engaged 
in various deradicalisation programs over the years with youth and prisoners, those who 
have potential to be radicalised and those who have already committed violent extremist 
acts. Pakistan has undertaken a holistic approach that encompasses the security apparatus, 
political, social and educational systems (Khan, 2015). Specific examples include two camps 
set up and run by the Pakistan military: Mishal for adults and Sabaoon for children who 
were indoctrinated by the Pakistani Taliban (Ahmad, 2015). They provide inmates with 
psychological counselling to deal with war trauma, moderate education from Imams to 
counter their extremist beliefs, and vocational training to make them economically 
independent. They undertake steps to publicise and support alternative dialogue and 
diversity. They promote inter-provincial, national, religious interaction. As in Afghanistan, 
individuals often identity themselves first as Muslim before a national identity, therefore 
placing moderate Islam at the centre of the strategy can help elicit positive responses from 
individuals. This structure needs to be replicated and more national and international 
NGOs need to be incorporated to reach the grassroots and cater to as many victims as 
possible (Khan, 2015).  
 
Best practices from these examples offer a multi-pronged approach that consider a range of 
interventions including religious guidance, vocational-training, psychological support, and 
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protection measures for individual and relatives. These efforts can harness good outcomes 
for youth who have grown up in a conflict environment (Burke, 2013). Approaches need to 
address the sources of violence, not the symptoms. Academics, governments and program 
heads espouse using community-level nongovernmental organisations and civil society 
organisations to bring together actors such as: victims of violence, mothers of fighters, 
reformed extremists, local elders, and Mullahs. These actors and could then work with the 
organisations to help deradicalise individuals through focusing on shared historic and 
cultural values, unity, nonviolent civil resistance, and the advantages of peace. However, in 
the Afghan context this is plagued with difficulties. It is rare to find those willing to 
cooperate with such programs when insecurity is so prevalent; the successful programs tend 
to take place in countries not currently going through a huge insurgency. Additionally 
asking an individual who was a member of an extremist organisation and was recently 
deradicalised to return to their community and not only inform others that they no longer 
follow previously held beliefs, but to dissuade others from the same path, would take a great 
deal of courage. Recidivism seems a more realistic option. 
 
It is critical to identify the primary target audiences of these efforts, especially youth, former 
fighters, refugees, and prisoners who are most vulnerable to recruitment and radicalisation. 
Many young disenfranchised Afghans are highly susceptible to the grievance-oriented 
rhetoric espoused by radical Mullahs who can easily exploit societal unease with the 
government. Refugee camps near the border with Pakistan are also significant sites for 
insurgent radicalisation and continue to supply fighters to the battlefield (Roehrs, 2015). 
Afghan prisoners are likewise a vulnerable group, especially in prisons like Polecharki and 
Bagram where Taliban leaders have maintained influence throughout the past decade. The 
Afghanistan prison system makes no concerted effort to segregate prisoners, thus enabling 
an environment in which criminals can be influenced and radicalised. Within these prisons 
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the Taliban manage to run their daily operations through their extensive prison network 
having easy access to mobile telephones and outside informants, often by females who 
remain unsearched due to Afghan custom. Understanding the more precarious situations of 
these particular populations helps clarify how radicalisation occurs in the Afghan context 
while also highlighting pragmatic options for targeted deradicalisation efforts. However, it is 
extremely difficult for organisations to complete research within the country in order to 
identify those who are most at risk (preventive measures) and getting through to those who 
can be rehabilitated (deradicalised). For the latter, the major difficultly is not finding them, 
but getting through to them, allowing program staff to build trust, work with them, and 
ultimately make sure recidivism does not happen.   
 
Targets the Afghan government set must remain realistic. The immediate need in 
Afghanistan is to tackle the mechanisms for radicalisation and supporting groups most 
vulnerable to radicalisation. Afghanistan’s first step should be to adopt a nationwide 
deradicalisation program. The Kabul government could learn lessons from Saudi Arabia, 
Indonesia and elsewhere and target the entire political and social landscape. A 
comprehensive deradicalisation strategy should continue to address core, widespread 
grievances such as insecurity and corruption, with the Afghan government taking the lead 
with the international community in a supporting role. Programs that offer a range of 
interventions such as vocational training, psychosocial support, and individual and family 
protection measures can help rehabilitate youth. Programs must explicitly and 
systematically address drivers of violence. If successful, the on-going peace talks with the 
Taliban may allow for greater scope to reach individuals who want to put down their 
weapons and return to normality. Indeed it may even allow access to those who have been 
disbanding from the Taliban to Daesh if they see an alternative that could yield long-term 
success. 
  
 
 
Johnnie Auld: The need for a national deradicalisation program in Afghanistan 
221 
Fall/15 
Nr. 4 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
 
Conclusion 
A lack of any coherent government run national deradicalisation strategy should be of 
concern to Afghans and international community. The pool of potential recruits to join the 
Taliban and other extremist groups is rife due to Afghanistan’s violent, hostile environment 
with high rates of poverty, high unemployment and low levels of education. If unchecked 
this will expand to increase instability in the country and the region. Religion is used a 
justification by extremist groups for individuals to commit violent acts in a country that is 
extremely conservatively religious. The weak school system and high number of 
unregistered madrasas increases the likelihood of radicalisation. The decrease in security 
and general distrust toward the government will only exacerbate the problem and allow for 
more individuals to radicalise. Despite 14 years and billions of dollars spent by foreign 
countries, it is strange that no programs exist to deradicalise extremists at a time when soft 
power approaches are being increasingly implemented worldwide. The Afghan government 
needs to work with international donors to create a strong deradicalisation program that will 
enable combatants to reintegrate into their communities and permanently desist from 
violence. This is not a quick fix and will take years to accomplish, however learning from 
lessons, both successes and failures from other states, Afghanistan can implement 
nationwide programs to help tackle the radicalisation problem. 
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